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The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance 
Jill E. Fisch† 
Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken  
Jonathan Macey. Princeton, 2008. Pp vii, 334. 
 
Corporate governance is in trouble. The implosion of Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers, the near collapse of Citigroup and other large 
commercial banks, the bankruptcy of the US auto industry, and the 
massive overexposure of AIG to subprime risk have wreaked unprece-
dented turmoil in the capital markets and a widespread crisis of confi-
dence in the quality of operational decisionmaking at US corporations.  
Poor corporate governance may be a contributing factor.
1
 Critics 
have described the corporate governance culture at Bear Stearns, for 
example, as “straight out of the 1920s.”
2
 Bear’s board of directors met 
just six times a year, leaving primary oversight of the company to Bear’s 
all-insider executive committee.
3
 Bear did not create a finance and risk 
committee until January 2007, just a year before its failure.
4
 Two mem-
bers of Bear’s audit committee served on the audit committees of five 
and six other companies, respectively, yet the board determined that, 
based upon their “wealth of financial experience,” this service did not 
“impair their ability to effectively serve on the Company’s Audit Com-
mittee.”
5
 In short, the board was “another one of these all male clubs 
that acts like a throwback to black and white movies.”
6
  
Citigroup’s board led the company to a string of quarterly losses, 
three government bailouts, and a share price that dipped to 97 cents in 
                                                                                                                           
 † Perry Golkin Professor of Law, The University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
I am grateful to Don Langevoort, Adam Pritchard, and Hillary Sale for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft. 
 1 But see Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” during the 2008 Stock Mar-
ket Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500 *36–37 (ECGI Working Paper, July 2009), online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396126 (visited Sept 15, 2009) (arguing that corporate governance did 
not fail). 
 2 J. Richard Finlay, Outrage of the Week: Leadership Fiddles while Bear Stearns Burns 
(Mar 14, 2008), online at http://finlayongovernance.com/?p=423 (visited Sept 20, 2009). 
 3 See Bear Stearns 2007 Proxy Statement 4 (Mar 27, 2007), online at  
http://www.bearstearns.com/includes/pdfs/investor_relations/proxy/proxy2007.pdf (visited Oct 15, 
2009).  
 4 See id at 6. 
 5 Id at 5. 
 6 Finlay, Outrage of the Week: Leadership Fiddles while Bear Stearns Burns (cited in 
note 2). 




 Professor Jack Coffee describes Citigroup’s “extreme 
risk-taking,” which caused it to become the largest issuer of collatera-
lized debt obligations worldwide by 2007, as motivated by the bonus 
compensation paid to its senior executives.
8
 Despite the company’s 
problems, the board was reelected in April 2009 by more than 
70 percent of shares voted.
9
 The company nominated four new direc-
tors for its board in response to government pressure,
10
 but it retained 
ten board members, four of whom were opposed by proxy advisory 
firm RiskMetrics, and six of whom were opposed by Glass Lewis.
11 
Subsequently, despite widespread criticism of executive compensation 
packages at the big investment banks, Citigroup announced that it was 
restructuring its compensation to enable it to pay its employees as 




Are existing mechanisms of corporate governance ineffective 
and, if so, what explains the inability of US corporations to establish 
effective mechanisms? Because of the centrality of business perfor-
mance to the national and global economies, as Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny observe, “the subject of corporate governance is of 
enormous practical importance.”
13
 This importance has led commenta-
tors to debate governance reforms for decades. Critics attributed the 
many examples of corporate misconduct in the late 1990s, of which 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Madlen Read, Citi Shareholders Show Rage at Annual Meeting, Bus Wk (Apr 23, 2009), 
online at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/apr2009/pi20090421_257312.htm (vi-
sited Oct 15, 2009). 
 8 John C. Coffee, Jr, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 
Financial Crisis, 9 J Corp L Stud 1, 17 n 54 (2009).  
 9 See Bradley Keoun and Ian Katz, Pandit Says Citigroup to Rebound as  
Board Is Elected, Bloomberg (Apr 21, 2009) online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601087&sid=aMn8wmi1HSJw&refer=home (visited Oct 15, 2009). 
 10 Josh Fineman and Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup Nominates Four Board  
Members in Revamp, Bloomberg (Mar 16, 2009) online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWKrIwimvaQA (visited Oct 16, 2009) (describing the “govern-
ment-induced shakeup”). 
 11 Keoun and Katz, Pandit Says Citigroup to Rebound as Board Is Elected  
(cited in note 9). See also David Reilly, Jobs for Bankers Go Begging at  
Off-Limits Club, Bloomberg (May 20, 2009), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601039&sid=aNHxTHiTQHo8&refer=home (visited Oct 16, 2009) (stating that only 
15 percent of directors at the ten largest US commercial banks have banking experience and ar-
guing that bank board members should have more financial expertise). 
 12 See Citi Boosting Salaries to Offset Lower Bonuses, LA Times (June 25, 2009), online at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/25/business/fi-citipay25?pg=1 (visited Sept 20, 2009) (describ-
ing pay controversy and Citigroup’s changes to its executive compensation).  
 13 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J Fin 737, 
737 (1997). 
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Enron and WorldCom are the most prominent examples, to continued 
and widespread deficiencies in corporate governance—from defec-
tively structured boards of directors and conflicted auditors to inade-
quate internal controls.
14
 As Jack Coffee explains: “In the 2001–2002 
crisis that led up to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers at literally 
hundreds of companies inflated earnings, typically by prematurely 
recognizing income, which behavior resulted in the number of annual 
financial statement restatements growing hyperbolically over the pe-
riod from 1996 to 2002.”
15
 In an effort to redress these deficiencies, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the most compre-
hensive federal regulation of corporate governance ever.
16
  
Although many commentators criticized Sarbanes-Oxley as a leg-
islative overreaction,
17
 agency costs, conflicts of interest, and funda-
mental failures in corporate decisionmaking persisted. Many of these 
failures have come to light since 2008, as the widespread effect of the 
credit crisis has unearthed problems ranging from egregious errors in 
risk management at AIG
18
 and Bear Stearns
19
 to the decision by auto 
industry executives who, unable to maintain their businesses as sol-




                                                                                                                           
 14 See, for example, David A. Skeel, Jr, Governance in the Ruins, 122 Harv L Rev 696, 722–23 
(2008) (describing weaknesses in WorldCom’s corporate governance). 
 15 Coffee, 9 J Corp L Stud at 2 (cited in note 8). 
 16 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, codified at 15 USC § 7201 
et seq. See, for example, Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv L Rev 588, 590 (2004) 
(stating that Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley “in reaction to the corporate governance failures 
at Enron and WorldCom”). 
 17 See Cheryl L. Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX Undermine 
Its Benefits?, 39 Loyola U Chi L J 595, 595 (2008) (describing the “business community’s criti-
cism of SOX [as] almost virulent”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making 
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L J 1521, 1528 (2005) (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as 
“emergency legislation”); Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres?: The Curious 
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 373, 435 (2004) (stating 
that Sarbanes-Oxley was a “hasty and ill-considered law”).  
 18 See Carrick Mollenkamp, et al, Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-
World Test, Wall St J A1 (Nov 3, 2008) (detailing failures in AIG’s risk management). 
 19 See Kara Scannell, Crisis on Wall Street: Bear Stearns Is Faulted on Its Valuations in 2007, 
Wall St J B3 (Oct 18, 2008) (describing improper asset valuations as a deficiency in Bear 
Stearns’s risk management). 
 20 See, for example, Josh Levs, Big Three Auto CEOs Flew Private Jets to Ask for Taxpayer 
Money, CNN.com (Nov 18, 2008), online at http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/19/autos.ceo.jets 
(visited Sept 15, 2009) (describing criticism directed at CEOs of Big Three auto companies “for 
flying private jets to Washington to request taxpayer bailout money”). 
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These failures will, in turn, spawn a new wave of corporate go-
vernance reforms. It has been less than two years since the United 
States Treasury Department proposed its blueprint for financial regu-
lation,
21
 which was premised largely upon the relaxing of regulatory stan-
dards in order to increase the global competitiveness of US businesses.
22
 
Now, instead, businesses face the potential for still more extensive regula-
tory intervention. Congress and regulators are already taking steps to 
monitor issuer transactions involving risky financial products,
23
 to control 
the level and structure of executive compensation,
24
 and to increase 
shareholder input into the selection of corporate directors.
25
  
In light of these new reform efforts, it has become vitally impor-
tant to understand US corporate governance better—the existing me-
chanisms and how they work, the regulatory and structural attributes 
that limit their potential effectiveness, and the extent to which corpo-
rate governance failures contributed to the most recent economic cri-
sis. Toward that end, Jonathan Macey offers a valuable tool with his 
latest book—Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken. 
Macey, a leading scholar in corporate law, provides a critical assess-
ment of existing corporate governance mechanisms: from independent 
boards of directors, to gatekeepers such as audit firms and credit rat-
ing agencies. The core thesis of Promises Kept is that government reg-
ulation has sponsored ineffective governance mechanisms while, at the 
same time, disfavoring or even interfering with effective market-based 
mechanisms (pp 275–76). Macey’s prescription for corporate gover-
nance failures is simple: enhance the disciplinary effect of the capital 
markets and embrace governance mechanisms that make market pric-
ing more efficient and more powerful, while reducing reliance on go-
vernance institutions that are unreliable (p 278).  
Promises Kept, which comprehensively evaluates thirteen differ-
ent corporate governance mechanisms, should be required reading for 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar 
2008), online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2009). 
 22 See Martha Graybow, Deregulation Calls Go Silent as Wall St Reels, Reuters (Sept 23, 2008), 
online at http://in.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=INTRE48L09R20080922 (visited Sept 15, 2009) 
(noting how “pro-business advocates fretting about the future of Wall Street went on the warpath to 
try to roll back post-Enron corporate reforms they saw as a threat to U.S. competitiveness”). 
 23 See Kara Scannell and Serena Ng, Derivatives Plan Is Expected, Wall St J C7 (July 30, 
2009) (recounting the progress of legislation to regulate derivatives). 
 24 See Jonathan Weisman and Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays out Limits on Executive Pay, 
Wall St J A1 (Feb 5, 2009) (discussing the limits on executive pay for firms that receive TARP 
bailout funds). 
 25 SEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (June 10, 2009), online at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2009). 
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policymakers considering the adoption of new regulations. Macey of-
fers a wealth of historical background and institutional detail. He illu-
strates his analysis with numerous examples—classic corporate law 
cases such as Dirks v SEC
26
 and Smith v Van Gorkom,
27
 as well as 
modern battles such as Carl Icahn’s effort to break up Time Warner in 
2005 (pp 254–64). Macey persuasively explains how easy it is for regu-
lators to get it wrong and demonstrates how even well-intended regu-
lations can have perverse effects. Political pressure and interest group 
forces are likely to render regulation even less effective.  
At the same time, Macey’s project does not go far enough. Al-
though Macey is correct in championing market discipline over regu-
latory solutions, the history of US business suggests that market incen-
tives alone may be insufficient to constrain—and may even exacer-
bate—some forms of managerial wrongdoing, including fraud, self-
dealing, and excessive risk-taking. Going forward, the challenge for 
regulatory reform is to address and improve the effectiveness of capi-
tal market discipline.  
Part I of this Review considers several of the governance me-
chanisms most heavily criticized by Macey—boards of directors, 
shareholder voting, and litigation. Part II examines Macey’s preferred 
“market-based” alternatives—the takeover market, the initial public 
offering, and hedge funds. In Part III, this Review considers the effect 
of the Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 on Macey’s analysis. While the 
crisis offers compelling evidence of the failure of several traditional 
governance mechanisms, it also highlights weaknesses in the capacity 
of the markets to provide effective discipline. This Review identifies 
several reasons for these weaknesses and argues that addressing these 
reasons should be the focus of regulatory reform efforts.  
I.  MACEY’S THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The core thesis of Promises Kept is that regulatory interventions 
have interfered with corporate governance—limiting those mechanisms 
that are most effective and encouraging those that are least effective. 
The thesis is summarized in a chart in which Macey details thirteen cor-
porate governance mechanisms and classifies them according to wheth-
er they are (1) effective and (2) regulatorily encouraged (p 50). The two 
right hand columns highlight Macey’s conclusion: there is no overlap 
between column one—those mechanisms that are effective—and col-
                                                                                                                           
 26 463 US 646 (1983). 
 27 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985). 
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umn two—those that are encouraged. Regulators, in Macey’s view, have 
consistently gotten corporate governance wrong. 
Macey goes on to examine the various governance mechanisms in 
detail, devoting, in most cases, a separate chapter to each. His metho-
dology, which draws on a mixture of theoretical analysis, academic 
literature, and case study illustrations (but not extensively on empiri-
cal analysis
28
), explains the operation of each governance device and 
the extent to which its role has been the subject of regulatory encou-
ragement or limitations. 
The governance institution that receives Macey’s most extensive 
attack is the board of directors (pp 51–89). Macey correctly observes 
that corporate governance scholarship has focused considerable atten-
tion on the composition, quality, and particularly the independence of 
the board of directors. As Macey explains, “The board of directors is at 
the epicenter of U.S. corporate governance” (p 51).  
Macey argues forcefully that this reliance is misplaced. Corporate 
boards are, he claims, subject to capture as a result of management 
ties, cognitive biases, and social norms that undermine directors’ abili-
ty to exercise independent judgment. Directors are, for example, 
bound by norms of collegiality that make it difficult to question man-
agement (p 61). Directors’ access to corporate information is general-
ly subject to management control (p 60).
29
 Directors and senior execu-
tives operate at close proximity, through a web of professional and 
social ties (p 57).
30
 As a result of these forces, boards are unlikely to 
serve as effective monitors (p 57).
31
 
At the same time, the increased importance of board monitoring 
impedes the directors’ ability to serve as strategic advisors. Macey de-
scribes the “dual role” of boards as both monitors and advisors and ex-
plains that these roles are internally inconsistent (pp 53–54). Board in-
volvement in a managerial function limits the board’s capacity to serve as 
a monitor. As Macey puts it, the directors face an inherent conflict when 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Macey’s project would benefit from a more detailed discussion of the extensive empiri-
cal literature addressing the efficacy of various corporate governance mechanisms. See, for ex-
ample, Romano, 114 Yale L J at 1529–43 (cited in note 17) (summarizing the empirical studies of 
the corporate governance provisions that were addressed in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation). 
 29 Macey describes the resulting potential for management to bias the flow of information 
to the board (p 60). 
 30 Macey explains the “trade-off between objectivity and proximity” (p 57). 
 31 Macey distinguishes dissident directors who, he argues, are not subject to managerial 
capture (p 90). Dissident directors are generally activist investors, such as principals at hedge 
funds. While these directors may bring an expertise to the board in enhancing firm value through 
restructuring transactions such as spin-offs, sales, and mergers, dissident directors typically lack 
the operational skills that would allow them to add long-term value through strategic advising. 
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they are called upon to evaluate decisions in which they previously parti-
cipated (p 54). In addition, board participation in strategic planning 
strengthens the board’s commitment and ties to the current management 
team, increasing the likelihood of board capture (p 63). 
Although Macey is not the first scholar to recognize the inherent 
tension between the board’s monitoring and managing functions,
32
 he 
is clearly correct in his claim that the two functions are largely irre-
concilable. That battle, however, has long been lost. Corporations 
largely have sacrificed the potential value of managing boards in favor 
of the independent monitoring board.
33
 What is less clear, however, is 
that the monitoring board has been a failure on its own terms.  
Concededly, monitoring boards do not offer corporations strategic 
advice, operational analysis, or other types of managerial support. As a 
result, large-scale empirical studies are unlikely to find a link between 
board monitoring and firm performance.
34
 Rather, monitoring boards 
are likely to provide the most value in deterring managerial self-dealing 
and responding to crises. Assessing the deterrent value of board moni-
toring requires an impossible counterfactual analysis—would manage-
ment have engaged in misconduct but for the monitoring?
35
 Assessing 
the value of the board in crisis management presents similar challenges. 
Corporations for which crisis management is important are a subset of 
all corporations. Within this subset, the absence of a benchmark makes 
it difficult to know if the board’s actions were appropriate—did the 
board respond soon enough, and were the steps it took effective?  
                                                                                                                           
 32 Indeed, I made this point myself more than a decade ago. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking 
Boards Seriously, 19 Cardozo L Rev 265, 280 (1997) (stating that “there is a natural inconsistency 
between the board’s monitoring and managing functions”). See also Victor Brudney, The Indepen-
dent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 Harv L Rev 597, 632–39 (1982) (recognizing 
this tension and warning of the dangers of privileging the board’s monitoring function). 
 33 See, for example, Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan L Rev 1465, 1469 
(2007) (“[F]rom the post-World War II era to the present . . . the board’s principal role shifted 
from the ‘advising board’ to the ‘monitoring board,’ and director independence became corres-
pondingly critical.”). 
 34 One of the most careful and extensive studies in this area, conducted by Bernie Black and 
Sanjai Bhagat, found “no convincing evidence that increasing board independence . . . will improve 
firm performance.” Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus Law 921, 922 (1999). See also Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard 
Black, The Non-correlation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J 
Corp L 231, 233 (2002) (finding that poorly performing firms often increase the independence of their 
boards, but there is no evidence that this strategy improves performance).  
 35 Eric Helland and Michael Sykuta do find that issuers with more independent boards are 
less likely to be sued by shareholders. Eric Helland and Michael Sykuta, Who’s Monitoring the 
Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders’ Interests?, 40 Fin Rev 155, 157 (2005). 
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More significantly, as Jeff Gordon suggests, the evolution of the 
monitoring board appears to be more a product of market forces than 
regulatory intervention.
36
 To be sure, the Delaware courts have en-
couraged the use of independent directors in the context of specific 
decisions, such as evaluating tender offers or responding to derivative 
litigation,
37
 but these decisions neither require a majority independent 
board nor limit the board’s role to monitoring. Sarbanes-Oxley and 
the self-regulating organization (SRO) rules mandate increased board 
independence,
38
 but these requirements are of relatively recent origin 
and largely reflect preexisting corporate norms. Indeed, probably the 
most substantial factor in the move to independent monitoring boards 
has been the market pressure imposed by institutional investors.
39
  
Whether those pressures were misguided remains an open ques-
tion.
40
 Several empirical studies have shown that independent boards 
function more effectively in specific situations.
41
 James Cotter, Anil Shiv-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Gordon, 59 Stan L Rev at 1477–99 (cited in note 33) (describing various factors 
contributing to increased board independence). Alternatively, one could view the monitoring 
board as a low cost accommodation to the political pressure imposed by state pension funds—a 
perspective that is consistent with some of Macey’s observations in other parts of the book about 
the role of political forces (pp 33, 45, 126).  
 37 See, for example, In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation, 824 A2d 917, 942–46 (Del Ch 
2003) (rejecting the dismissal recommendation of a special litigation committee based on lack of 
evidence that committee members were sufficiently independent); Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum 
Co, 493 A2d 946, 954–55 (Del 1985) (holding that the existence of a majority of independent direc-
tors on the board “materially enhance[s]” the proof needed to satisfy the burden of “good faith and 
reasonable investigation” upon judicial review of a board’s rejection of a tender offer). 
 38 See 15 USC § 78j-1(m)(3) (mandating that “[e]ach member of the audit committee of the 
issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent”); 
Listed Company Manual § 303A.05(a) (NYSE, July 2009), online at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections (visited Oct 16, 2009) (“Listed companies must have a 
compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors.”); Nasdaq Marketplace Rules 
§ 4200(a)(15) (NASDAQ, Jan 13, 2006), online at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ 
Tools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasd
aq-equityrules%2F (visited Oct 16, 2009) (defining an “[i]ndependent [d]irector” as “a person 
other than an Executive Officer or employee of the Company or any other individual having a 
relationship which, in the opinion of the Company’s board of directors, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director”). 
 39 See, for example, Symposium Transcript, The Institutional Investor’s Goals for Corporate 
Law in the Twenty-first Century, 25 Del J Corp L 35, 40 (2000) (Carolyn Brancato) (explaining 
how “many major U.S. corporations and institutional investors have come to agree on certain 
fundamental corporate governance values . . . in such areas as the long-term mission of the board 
of directors [and] the need for independent non-executive directors”). 
 40 See, for example, Bhagat and Black, 27 J Corp L at 257 (cited in note 34) (describing 
evidence on value of independent boards as “equivocal”). 
 41 In that vein, Macey’s evidence of board failure appears to be anecdotal. Even accepting 
that the case studies discussed in Chapter 5 are evidence of board capture, they represent four of 
the thousands of publicly traded companies in the United States. See, for example, NYSE Euro-
next: Listings, online at http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1170350259411.html (visited Sept 15, 
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dasani, and Marc Zenner find that independent boards enhance target 
shareholder gains from takeovers.
42
 Michael Weisbach shows that inde-
pendent boards are more likely to respond to poor performance by re-
placing the CEO.
43
 John Byrd and Kent Hickman report that firms with a 
majority of outside directors make better acquisitions.
44
 More recent 
analysis suggests that the regulatory mandates for independence may 
themselves provide independent value. For example, Vidhi Chhaochharia 
and Yaniv Grinstein find that the imposition of SRO board indepen-
dence rules upon companies reduced CEO compensation.
45
 
More generally, increased board independence may have been a 
factor in modernizing corporations away from the overdiversified and 
inefficient conglomerates of the 1970s. One contributing factor is the 
ability of outside directors to respond to the information provided by 
the capital markets through stock prices. As Jeff Gordon observes, 
“the increasing informativeness and value of stock market signals” 
gave the outside directors an easy tool to use in their effort to enhance 
shareholder value.
46
 Transparent and efficient stock prices enable di-
rectors to use “stock price maximization as the measure of managerial 
success.”
47
 This in turn simplifies the board’s role as monitor.
48
  
Relying on stock price as the metric for evaluating governance 
complicates Macey’s case analysis, however. Specifically, although Ma-
cey describes TransUnion and Disney as involving “monumentally bad 
decision-making” and providing evidence of board capture, both cases, 
as Macey concedes, involved substantial shareholder gains (p 69). In 
TransUnion, the board approved a merger that provided a substantial 
                                                                                                                           
2009) (stating that the NYSE Euronext alone has approximately 8,500 listed companies). A 
corporate governance mechanism with that sort of failure rate would appear to be an unparal-
leled success. 
 42 James F. Cotter, Anil Shivdasani, and Marc Zenner, Do Independent Directors Enhance 
Target Shareholder Wealth during Tender Offers?, 43 J Fin Econ 195, 214 (1997). 
 43 Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J Fin Econ 431, 457 (1988). 
 44 John W. Byrd and Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence 
from Tender Offer Bids, 32 J Fin Econ 195, 195 (1992). Byrd and Hickman suggest, however, that 
it is possible to have boards that are too independent. Id at 199. 
 45 Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv Grinstein, CEO Compensation and Board Structure, 64 J 
Fin 231, 232 (2009). 
 46 Gordon, 59 Stan L Rev at 1472 (cited in note 33). 
 47 Id at 1470–72. See also Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv Grinstein, Corporate Governance 
and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, 62 J Fin 1789, 1814 (2007) (finding 
that Sarbanes Oxley’s requirement of an independent audit committee benefited large and 
medium size firms but not small firms). 
 48 I have criticized the reliance on stock price as the exclusive measure of firm value else-
where. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Prima-
cy, 31 J Corp L 637, 673 (2006) (arguing that stock price may be an overly narrow measure of 
firm value and that overreliance on stock price may lead to poor management decisions). 
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premium for stockholders—41 percent more than the highest price at 
which the stock had traded in the previous five years (p 73). In Disney, 
the market value of Disney’s stock increased by more than $1 billion 
in a single day in response to the announcement that Michael Ovitz 
had been hired (p 78).
49
  
Moreover, if informed stock prices enhance market discipline, 
perhaps board effectiveness should be understood in terms of price 
quality, not absolute price. The monitoring board focuses the role of 
independent directors on assuring the reliability of firm financial dis-
closure.
50
 Evolving governance norms and regulations such as Sar-
banes-Oxley both address financial transparency and prescribe specif-
ic requirements for the board generally, and the audit committee in 
particular, designed to increase information flow and reduce capture 
of the independent directors.
51
 These reforms appear consistent with 
Macey’s conception of effective governance.  
Macey’s second major target is shareholder voting (pp 199–222). 
Macey summarizes the traditional theoretical arguments against 
greater shareholder voice—shareholders suffer from collective action 
problems, lack sufficient stakes to research election issues adequately, 
and engage in rational apathy (pp 202–04). He also challenges Lucian 
Bebchuk’s claim that meaningful democratic voice is necessary to con-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Concededly the terms of Ovitz’s employment contract—specifically the amount of his 
severance package—were not part of the public announcement. 
 50 Elsewhere, Macey rejects the effectiveness of accounting firms, arguing that they suffer 
from cartelization and capture (pp 155–64). The failure of accounting firms might as easily be 
attributed to insufficient regulation. Although the SEC has authority to regulate both accounting 
and auditing directly, historically it has delegated this responsibility to the industry. See George J. 
Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting before and after Enron, 52 Emo-
ry L J 1325, 1333 (2003). The failures at Enron, including the lax accounting rules that permitted 
Enron to mask a large percentage of its liabilities and losses, were promulgated by the industry 
itself. See id at 1336–38 (describing Enron’s abuse of GAAP). See also John C. Coffee, Jr, Gate-
keeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 BU L Rev 301, 319 
(2004) (describing the decline in auditor accountability during 1990s). More recently, critics have 
attributed many of the financial industry failures to a lack of transparency associated with deriv-
atives and other risky financial products—a lack of transparency that impeded capital markets 
monitoring. See, for example, Gordon L. Clark and Eric R.W. Knight, Implications of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 for Institutional Investors and the Market for Corporate Social Responsibili-
ty, 11 U Pa J Bus L 259, 262 (2009) (“Indeed the current global credit crisis, which has its origins 
in widespread defaults on subprime mortgage loans in the United States, is an example where 
the lack of transparency in financial markets resulted in asymmetric information and the mis-
pricing of the real risk behind traded mortgage-backed derivatives.”). 
 51 See, for example, Adriaen M. Morse, Jr, Breaking the Circle: The Problem of Independent 
Directors Policing Public Company Financial Disclosure under the SEC’s New Rules Governing 
Public Company Audit Committees, 23 Ann Rev Bank & Fin L 673, 691–712 (2004) (discussing 
the manner in which Sarbanes-Oxley attempts to increase independent director effectiveness in 
monitoring financial disclosure). 
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fer legitimacy on corporate directors (pp 211–12).
52
 Nonetheless, Ma-
cey recognizes that traditional economic theory likely overstates col-
lective action problems to the extent that investors face similar issues 
with respect to many of their portfolio companies, or evaluate director 
candidates over multiple terms or in multiple companies (p 208). In-
deed, Macey appears to accept that enhanced shareholder voting 
rights with respect to takeovers in general and poison pills in particu-
lar might be an effective governance mechanism (p 205).
53
 Macey also 
observes that the capital markets consistently afford a premium to 
voting shares (pp 220–21).
54
 Nonetheless, Macey’s support for share-
holder voting is lukewarm at best, leading him to classify it as an inef-
fective governance mechanism (p 50). 
Macey also describes voting as favored by regulation, a descrip-
tion that is in tension with the many regulatory limitations on share-
holder voting power. The SEC, for example, has limited the ability of 
shareholders to overcome collective action problems by mandating 
extensive disclosure in connection with the solicitation of proxies.
55
 
Through its shareholder proposal rule, the SEC has interposed its staff 
as the primary determinant of what constitutes a proper subject for 
the exercise of shareholder voting power.
56
 In 2007, the SEC amended 
its rules to overturn the effect of a federal court decision permitting 
shareholders to modify the director nomination process through di-
rect nomination bylaws,
57
 although the new Democrat-controlled SEC 
recently proposed a rule that would provide shareholders with proxy 
access under specified circumstances.
58
  
Other regulatory interventions further limit shareholder voting 
power. The statutory default rule for electing directors in all states is 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va L 
Rev 675, 676 (2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
Harv L Rev 835, 837 (2005). 
 53 Macey states that “poison pills should not be adopted unless shareholders are allowed to 
vote on them first” (p 205). 
 54 More precisely, the capital markets impose a discount on nonvoting shares. 
 55 See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regula-
tion, 46 Vand L Rev 1129, 1139–41 (1993) (summarizing federal regulation of the proxy solicita-
tion process). Rule 13(d) also chills shareholder collective action by imposing a disclosure re-
quirement on shareholders who form a group for the purpose of influencing control of a corpo-
ration. See id at 1170, 1198 n 318 (noting the “potential chilling effect of Rule 13(d) on collective 
action by shareholders in connection with voting”). 
 56 See id at 1157–59 (describing several controversial staff determinations). 
 57 See SEC, Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors (Dec 7, 2007), 
online at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-56914.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2009) (overturning 
the result in AFSCME v American International Group, Inc, 462 F3d 121 (2d Cir 2006)). 
 58 SEC, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (cited in note 25). 




 Under plurality voting, shareholder efforts to oppose 
management-nominated directors outside the mechanism of a proxy 
contest are ineffective—by definition shareholders cannot defeat a 
management candidate without nominating an alternative candidate.
60
 
The ability of incumbent management to use corporate resources, vir-
tually without limit, to solicit proxies also creates a substantial funding 
imbalance that deters election contests and other challenges.
61
 Until 
recently, even the rules of the SROs reduced the effectiveness of the 
shareholder vote by granting brokers the discretion to vote custodial 
shares for which they lacked explicit voting instructions—shares that 
historically were voted in favor of management.
62
  
Because of these restrictions, shareholder voting has traditionally 
been relatively ineffective, as Macey argues (pp 199–200). Arguably, 
however, shareholder voting offers the potential to serve as a mediated 
market constraint on managerial power, mediated in the sense that it 
enables shareholders collectively to exercise control in a more mod-
erated fashion than by selling their stock, either to a hostile bidder or 
into the open market. For shareholders who believe a corporation’s 
strategic direction is misguided, a shift in board representation may 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See, for example, Joseph McCafferty, Majority Voting for Director Elections, Directorship 
(Dec 16, 2008), online at http://www.directorship.com/majority-voting-for-director-elections (visited 
Oct 17, 2009) (“Under the corporate law of all U.S. states, the default voting threshold for director 
election—the one that applies unless the company provides otherwise—is a plurality.”). 
 60 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barba-
rians inside the Gates, 45 Stan L Rev 857, 904–05 (1993) (describing plurality voting and explain-
ing that, under plurality voting, “even if the overwhelming majority of shareholders withhold 
authority from management’s unopposed slate, those unopposed nominees will still successfully 
gain a plurality of the votes cast as long as a small minority of shareholders supports manage-
ment’s nominees”). 
 61 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy 
toward Proxy Contests, 78 Cal L Rev 1073, 1134–35 (1990) (describing the existing funding struc-
ture and proposing alternative funding rules). 
 62 See, for example, Vincent Falcone, Note, Majority Voting in Director Elections: A Simple, 
Direct and Swift Solution?, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 844, 870–71 (describing broker discretionary 
voting); Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, Embattled CEOs *29 (ECGI Working Paper, Dec 
2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281516 (visited Sept 15, 2009) (stating that brokers 
typically voted custodial shares in favor of management). On July 1, 2009, the SEC approved a rule 
change by the NYSE and NASDAQ eliminating discretionary voting in director elections. SEC, 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 4, to Amend NYSE Rule 
452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to Eliminate Broker Discretionary 
Voting for the Election of Directors, Except for Companies Registered under the Investment Compa-
ny Act of 1940, and to Codify Two Previously Published Interpretations that Do Not Permit Broker 
Discretionary Voting for Material Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts with an Investment 
Company *6 (July 1, 2009), online at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf (visited 
Sept 15, 2009). 




 For shareholders who believe management is over-
ly entrenched, governance changes, such as increasing shareholder nom-
ination power or dismantling takeover defenses, may be appropriate.  
Indeed, Macey’s discussion of dissident directors illustrates the 
potential power of shareholder voting. As Macey explains, hedge 
funds and other activist shareholders have begun to nominate short 
slates of director candidates for the purpose of changing the dynamic 
of the boards of underperforming companies (p 90). In most cases, the 
dissident slate is nominated on the platform of an identified strategic 
or structural change for the issuer—a financial restructuring, cost-
cutting, or a proposed sale of the company.
64
 By electing the dissident 
slate, shareholders are, in effect, voting their support for the activist’s 
platform. Although the empirical analysis of this activism has, to date, 
been limited, early studies suggest that such activism may increase 
firm value.
65
 Moreover, improving corporate governance through 
proxy contests is far less costly than a hostile takeover, making it po-
tentially viable at large public companies.  
Concededly, the case for shareholder voting has not yet been 
made. Institutional investors may have conflicts of interest or agendas 
that render increased shareholder power problematic, as Macey illu-
strates with his example of empty voting (pp 214–19).
66
 Other com-
mentators have raised similar concerns about the incentives of hedge 
funds,
67
 public pension funds,
68
 and union funds.
69
 At the end of the day, 
however, Macey’s own analysis suggests that shareholder voting offers 
                                                                                                                           
 63 This message is the impetus for Joseph Grundfest’s proposed “just vote no” campaigns. 
See Grundfest, 45 Stan L Rev at 865 (cited in note 60). 
 64 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Georgetown L J 1375, 
1379, 1390–97 (2007) (describing activist objectives with respect to target companies). 
 65 See, for example, Alon Brav, et al, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Performance, 63 J Fin 1729, 1771 (2008) (reporting that hedge fund activism “generates 
value on average”); Bratton, 95 Georgetown L J at 1381–82 (cited in note 64) (finding mixed 
results but considerable success by hedge funds both in achieving their objectives and in finan-
cial performance). 
 66 See also Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hid-
den (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S Cal L Rev 811, 828–35 (2006) (discussing empty voting in more 
detail); Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U Ill L Rev 775, 778 (describing 
how equity derivatives enable investors to separate economic interest from voting rights). 
 67 See, for example, Martin Lipton and William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 
93 Va L Rev 733, 746 (2007) (criticizing hedge funds for their short-term investment orientation).  
 68 See, for example, David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation and 
Retiree Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 BU Pub Intl L J 37, 66 (1995) 
(considering incentives of public pension fund managers and potential conflicts of interest). 
 69 See, for example, Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Go-
vernance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich L Rev 1018, 1019–25 (1998) (outlining 
potential concerns raised by union fund activism in corporate governance). 
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considerable potential for inducing management to keep its promises 
to shareholders. Reducing current regulatory restrictions may increase 
that potential. 
Macey also considers shareholder litigation (pp 130–54). He 
states that, according to conventional wisdom, shareholder litigation is 
second only to corporate boards in importance as a corporate gover-
nance mechanism (p 130). Macey believes that this conventional wis-
dom is simply “wrong” (p 130). In support, Macey describes a litiga-
tion system that is badly broken, one in which large amounts of money 
are transferred between investors with little overall benefit.
70
 He fur-
ther explains that the system is plagued by agency costs that leave 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in control of the system and create substantial in-
centives for abuse. The result, in his words, is a “litigation crisis” that 
increases the cost of capital (p 153).  
Criticisms of shareholder litigation for its excessive agency costs 
are widespread.
71
 In his own prior work, Macey proposed an innova-
tive mechanism for reducing these costs by auctioning off sharehold-
ers’ claims.
72
 Regulators have devoted extensive attention, however, to 
reducing agency costs through procedural restrictions and substantive 
limits on shareholder litigation. Indeed, the extent of these limits rais-
es a reasonable question as to whether Macey is fair in characterizing 
litigation as regulatorily encouraged.  
With respect to state court derivative litigation, traditional proce-
dural limits include a limitation on standing (the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement), a requirement that the plaintiff post, in some 
states, security for expenses, and most importantly, a requirement that 
the plaintiff either make a demand that the board of directors initiate 
the suit or demonstrate why such a demand would be futile.
73
 The sig-
nificance of these procedural limits pales beside the most important 
                                                                                                                           
 70 This transfer has been described as the “circularity problem.” See Jill E. Fisch, Confront-
ing the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 Wis L Rev 333, 337–38 (describ-
ing the circularity problem and offering a response). 
 71 See, for example, Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Share-
holder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand L Rev 133, 148–57 (2004) (discuss-
ing the litigation agency costs in shareholder litigation); Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. 
Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litiga-
tion, 38 Ariz L Rev 559, 566–72 (1996) (same). 
 72 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 
1, 6 (1991) (arguing that the winner of an auction would have similar litigation incentives as a 
traditional claimholder). 
 73 See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance through Shareholder Litigation, 
34 Ga L Rev 745, 753–54 (2000) (describing the procedural requirements of derivative litigation). 
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substantive limit on shareholder litigation under state law: the busi-
ness judgment rule. Corporate law essentially prohibits sharehold-
ers—outside a few narrow contexts—from using litigation to chal-
lenge operational or strategic decisions unless they can demonstrate a 
conflict of interest, the absence of an informed decisionmaking 
process, or a lack of good faith. The business judgment rule has the 
practical effect of limiting state law litigation to transactions involving 
self-dealing or conflicts of interest. As a result of this limitation, it is 




Federal securities litigation has, to some degree, supplanted de-
rivative litigation as a corporate governance mechanism by focusing, 
not on the substance of management decisions, but on the manner in 
which they were disclosed. Hillary Sale and Robert Thompson explain 
that federal securities litigation has increasingly offered shareholders 
a basis for enforcing duty of care claims that might previously have 
been litigated under state law.
75
  
Congress and the courts have repeatedly cut back on the scope of 
private securities litigation, however. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
recently observed: “To be successful, a securities class-action plaintiff 
must thread the eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over the 
years by judicial decree and congressional action.”
76
 Restrictions im-
posed by the Supreme Court include the Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc v 
Broudo
77
 decision on loss causation, and Central Bank of Denver v 
First Interstate Bank of Denver
78
 and Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
LLC v Scientific-Atlanta, Inc,
79
 which, together, limit the range of de-
fendants that private litigants can hold liable.
80
 Congress has imposed 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See, for example, Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Founda-
tion?, 7 J L, Econ, & Org 55, 84 (1991). 
 75 Robert B. Thompson and Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 Vand L Rev 859, 904 (2003). 
 76 Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v Flowserve Corp, 572 F3d 221, 235 (5th Cir 2009). 
 77 544 US 336 (2005). 
 78 511 US 164 (1994). 
 79 128 S Ct 761 (2008). 
 80 Some lower courts have, through expansive interpretations of these precedents, imposed 
even greater restrictions. See, for example, In re Flag Telecom Holdings, 574 F3d 29, 40 (2d Cir 
2009) (rejecting the inclusion of “in-and-out” traders in plaintiff class on the theory that they 
could not properly establish loss causation); Fener v Operating Engineers Construction Industry 
and Miscellaneous Pension Fund (Local 66), 579 F3d 401, 411 (5th Cir 2009) (stating that the 
plaintiff has suffered no injury unless the fraud caused the price of the stock to increase and its 
disclosure caused the price to go down); Oscar Private Equity Investments v Allegiance Telecom, 
Inc, 487 F3d 261, 270 (5th Cir 2007) (requiring the plaintiff to establish, at the class certification 
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a heightened pleading requirement and a stay on discovery pending 
the court’s resolution of the motion to dismiss, as well as limitations 
on liability and damages.
81
 
At the same time, institutional investors, particularly public 
pension funds, have become increasingly involved in shareholder liti-
gation. Early empirical studies suggest that these institutions have 
been remarkably effective in reducing the agency costs associated 
with private litigation.
82
 Cases involving institutional lead plaintiffs are 
settled for larger amounts and, at the same time, fee awards to plain-
tiffs’ counsel are lower, leaving a greater percentage of the settlement 
to compensate class members.
83
 Indeed, Macey discusses the landmark 
In re Cendant Corp Litigation
84
 decision, in which three public pension 
funds jointly supervised litigation that led to a record settlement, and 
a surprisingly low fee award (p 150). Although Macey is not explicit 
on this point, the Cendant fee award was only 1.7 percent of the class 
recovery,
85
 far less than the traditional benchmark of 25 to 30 percent.
86
 
Reducing the costs of private litigation increases its capacity to 
deter corporate misconduct. As a variety of commentators have ob-
served, this deterrent effect, although difficult to quantify, operates as 
                                                                                                                           
stage, by appropriate expert testimony, that it was the corrective disclosure of the fraud and not 
unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant amount of the stock price decline).  
 81 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified 
at 15 USC § 77a et seq. 
 82 See, for example, James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An 
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 Colum L Rev 1587, 1636 
(2006) (finding that institutional lead plaintiffs appear to add value by increasing settlement size, 
although finding that settlements have declined as a percentage of provable losses); Stephen J. 
Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff 
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 Wash U L Q 869, 900 (2005) (finding 
that involvement of public pension funds as lead plaintiffs is correlated with a greater likelihood 
of a high-value outcome). 
 83 See Cox and Thomas, 106 Colum L Rev at 1599, 1624 (cited in note 82) (noting that 
institutional lead plaintiffs “often able to lower counsel fees to one-half to one-third of the his-
torical average of 32% of the recovery” and demonstrating statistically that “institutional inves-
tor cases exhibit much larger settlements”). But see Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard, 83 Wash U L Q at 
900–01 (cited in note 82) (questioning whether the identified correlation is caused by institution-
al investor monitoring). 
 84 243 F Supp 2d 166 (D NJ 2003). 
 85 Id at 172–73. 
 86 Consider Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr, In re Cendant Litigation, Civil Action No 98-
CV-1664, n 4 (D NJ filed Aug 18, 1998), online at http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
1002/CD98/001.html (visited Oct 17, 2009) (reporting that 32 percent is the prevailing fee award 
benchmark), cited in Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection 
of Lead Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 L & Contemp Probs 53, 59 n 39 (2001). 
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a powerful corporate governance device.
87
 Importantly, the deterrent 
effect of litigation is supplemented by its role in increasing the effi-
ciency (and thereby the discipline) of the capital markets.  
In a recent article, I explain that private securities litigation, by 
compensating investors who engage in reliance-based trading, increas-
es their incentive to uncover, analyze, and rely on corporate disclo-
sures in their trading decisions.
88
 This activity performs a key role in 
enabling the trading markets to incorporate information into securi-
ties prices. Macey’s model of capital markets discipline depends criti-
cally upon informationally efficient markets which, in turn, require 
investors to engage in firm-specific research and to trade on the basis 
of that research. Although indexing and other passive investment 
strategies can reduce an investor’s risk of fraud-based losses, such 
strategies do not promote market efficiency. Private litigation can 
compensate informed traders who bear disproportionately the costs of 
research and of fraud because those traders, through their actions, 
create a positive corporate governance externality. 
II.  MARKET-BASED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A fundamental premise of Promises Kept is the superiority of 
capital market discipline to traditional corporate governance mechan-
isms such as boards, gatekeepers, and external institutions. As Macey 
explains, private sector market participants have the appropriate eco-
nomic incentives to address corporate governance in order to increase 
firm profitability (p 47).
89
 Moreover, these very incentives reduce the 
susceptibility of market actors to the political pressures that Macey 
blames for corrupting regulation.  
                                                                                                                           
 87 See, for example, Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations when Issuers 
Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wis L Rev 297, 302 (rejecting as “weak” the compensation rationale for liabili-
ty in favor of the deterrence rationale); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An 
Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis L Rev 243, 
246 (describing “deterring managerial misconduct” as “a major purpose of class-action lawsuits”). 
See also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges 
as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va L Rev 925, 929–30 (1999) (arguing that deterrence rather than 
compensation should be the primary goal in securities fraud litigation). 
 88 Fisch, 2009 Wis L Rev at 347 (cited in note 70). As I note, this justification does not 
square with the scope of liability permitted under Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224 (1988). See 
Fisch, 2009 Wis L Rev at 348 (cited in note 70) (observing that this defense may require a refor-
mulation of Basic). 
 89 Others question whether the 2008 economic crisis provides evidence to the contrary. See, 
for example, Edmond L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulations, NY Times B1 
(Oct 24, 2008) (describing testimony by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
stating that he had put “too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets”). 
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Macey reserves his highest praise for the takeover market 
(p 118).
90
 As he repeatedly explains, takeovers provide a market-based 
discipline for managers by enabling shareholders to replace managers 
of underperforming companies. A takeover bidder buys such a com-
pany and improves performance by effecting strategic changes, such as 
replacing management, cutting costs, or making structural changes. 
Because the company’s poor performance will have been reflected in 
a low stock price, and because efficient strategic changes will cause the 
stock price to increase, the bidder profits, as do shareholders who re-
main invested in the company. Selling shareholders benefit as well; as 
Macey explains, they generally receive a premium of around 
50 percent of the pre-bid trading price when they sell their stock in a 
tender offer (p 119). 
Macey’s defense of the hostile takeover is consistent with the 
dominant law and economics view of the 1980s—presented most fa-
mously by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel.
91
 Scholars such as 
Easterbrook and Fischel argued that, because of the clear benefits of 
the takeover market, incumbent management should be precluded 
from interfering with hostile takeovers. Accordingly, they advocated a 
policy of management passivity.
92
 
Other commentators disagreed, arguing that not all takeovers were 
efficient.
93
 Some takeovers, they argued, were economically irrational—
funded by cheap debt and leading to excessive leverage. These concerns 
have renewed resonance in today’s market. According to takeover crit-
ics, some takeovers consist largely of wealth transfers—from one group 
of shareholders to another,
94
 from creditors to shareholders, and from 
employees to shareholders. Some takeovers take advantage of market 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Macey states, “The most important market-inspired component of the U.S. corporate 
governance infrastructure is the market for corporate control” (p 118). 
 91 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 1164 (1981) (advocating required man-
agement passivity in response to a takeover bid). 
 92 Id at 1164. 
 93 Perhaps the best known advocate of management discretion in response to an unsoli-
cited takeover offer is Martin Lipton. See Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Pro-
fessors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 Del J Corp L 1, 29 (2002) (observing that managers may 
have better information than shareholders about firm value); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in 
the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus Law 101, 107 (1989) (finding that in over half of the failed takeo-
ver attempts studied, shareholders were better off than they would have if the takeover bid had 
been successful).  
 94 See Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, Do Shareholders of 
Acquiring Firms Gain from Acquisitions? *23 (NBER Working Paper Series, Feb 2003), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9523.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2009) (finding that shareholders of acquir-
ing companies lose from acquisitions). 
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conditions to buy out shareholders at a temporary premium reflecting 
an unfair or bargain price. Shareholder collective action problems, 
coupled with, in some cases, incomplete disclosure and coercive struc-
tures, make it difficult for shareholders to identify these situations and 
to distinguish them from truly value-enhancing transactions.  
To date, the empirical analysis of takeovers has failed to resolve 
the dispute over their efficiency. Although the literature is too exten-
sive to review in detail here, some empirical studies support Macey’s 
claim that many takeovers are efficient, resulting in improved gover-
nance and producing synergistic gains.
95
 Others cast doubt on the effi-
ciency hypothesis. A well-known article by Shleifer and Vishny sug-
gests that irrational stock market misvaluation rather than synergies 
drives most takeovers.
96
 Research by Ming Dong, et al, finds that bid-
ders tend to expropriate value from target shareholders, either by 
“buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below fundamental 
value, or by paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less 
overvalued than the bidder.”
97
 Several studies have found that al-
though target shareholders may profit from a takeover, shareholders 
of the acquiring firm lose money.
98
 Empirical studies also suggest that 
takeovers, at least in some cases, adversely affect consumer welfare.
99
 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See, for example, Sanjai Bhagat, et al, Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and 
Evidence, 76 J Fin Econ 3, 6 (2005) (finding empirical results that “are consistent with the impor-
tance of both synergies and target-specific improvements such as removal of bad management”); 
Cong Wang and Fei Xie, Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 22 Rev Fin Stud 829, 842 (2009) (finding that acquisitions of firms with poor corpo-
rate governance by firms with good corporate governance generate higher synergy gains).  
 96 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J Fin Econ 
295, 307 (2003).  
 97 Ming Dong, et al, Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?, 61 J Fin 725, 
726 (2006).  
 98 See, for example, Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, Wealth 
Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 
60 J Fin 757, 758–59 (2005) (finding losses to acquiring firm shareholders of $240 billion from 
1998 through 2001); Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, Firm Size and 
the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J Fin Econ 201, 202, 226 (2004) (finding average loss to acquiring 
firm shareholders of $25.2 million that is not reversed over time); Gunther Tichy, What Do We 
Know about Success and Failure of Mergers?, 1 J Industry, Competition & Trade 347, 347 (2001) 
(summarizing various empirical studies and concluding that “[t]argets’ shareholders win, while 
bidders’ shareholders break even upon the announcement of a merger, but lose significantly in 
the long run”). But see Shantanu Dutta and Vijay Jog, The Long-Term Performance of Acquiring 
Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly, 33 J Bank & Fin 1400, 1400 (2009) (finding no negative 
long-term abnormal stock market returns for Canadian acquiring firms). 
 99 See, for example, Tichy, 1 J Industry, Competition & Trade at 347 (cited in note 98) (find-
ing that a quarter of mergers increase prices and half reduce the value of the firm). 
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Thus, from an efficiency perspective, the existing empirical evi-
dence is equivocal as to whether takeovers are an effective gover-
nance device and the extent to which existing regulatory restrictions 
are undesirable (p 122).
100
 In addition, existing restrictions have not 
eliminated the takeover. Macey reveals a degree of nostalgia for the 
transactions that characterized the mid-1980s (pp 236–37). Conceded-
ly, the two-tiered offers of that era are largely extinct, but hostile of-
fers are not. Indeed, hostile takeovers hit record levels in 2008 in re-
sponse to falling stock prices.
101
 More generally, although the poison 
pill and judicial decisions have reshaped the form of takeovers, they 
have not dissuaded hedge funds, private equity firms, and other bid-
ders from pursuing attractive targets.
102
 Even with the existing regula-
tory restrictions, the market for corporate control continues to func-
tion as a governance device.  
In addition, the takeover market is limited in its applicability as a 
corporate governance mechanism. Takeovers are costly, and some com-
panies are just too big to buy. The cost of financing requires appropriate 
credit market conditions. Most importantly, takeovers are only effective 
if a company’s stock price is undervalued. If stock price is too high, 
whether because of a general market bubble or company-specific fraud, 
the takeover market does not offer a mechanism for correction. For 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Antitakeover regulation has been defended as a defense to inefficiencies in the takeover 
market. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L J 201, 237 (noting that 
proponents of antitakeover regulation cite the lack of consideration for non-shareholder losses 
in the takeover market). Poison pills, staggered boards, the Williams Act, Pub L No 90-439, 82 
Stat 454 (1968), codified at 15 USC § 78 et seq, and state antitakeover statutes enable the board 
to interpose itself on the shareholders’ behalf, both identifying inefficient transactions and nego-
tiating to extract the maximum possible premium in efficient deals. The extent to which these 
mechanisms impede efficient transactions depends on the quality and independence of the 
board. Thus, as Macey correctly observes, antitakeover devices can enable entrenched manage-
ment to delay and in some cases block takeovers entirely, even takeovers that were arguably 
efficient (such as Paramount’s bid for Time) (p 125). Paramount Communications, Inc v Time, 
Inc, 571 A2d 1140, 1147–49 (Del 1998). Empirical studies have shown that firms with extensive 
antitakeover protections tend to underperform the market, suggesting that such protections are 
at least correlated with management entrenchment, although it is difficult to determine the 
direction of causality. See, for example, Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, Corporate 
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q J Econ 107, 144–45 (2003) (finding that firms with more 
takeover protection have lower profit margins, lower returns on equity, and slower sales growth). 
 101 See Jessica Hall, Hostile Takeovers Hit Record as Market Swoons, Reuters (Sept 29, 2008), 
online at http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUSTRE48S2P120080929 (visited 
Sept 20, 2009) (stating that, as of September 2008, hostile deal activity had reached a record high of 
$211 billion, and that unfriendly deals for the year accounted for 22.1 percent of all US mergers). 
 102 See Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 Fla 
St U L Rev 211, 237 (2007) (describing the “fifth wave” of takeover activity as continuing from 
the mid-1990s through 2007, with $1.6 trillion in completed takeover activity in 2006). 
2010] The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance 943 
 
companies like Enron and WorldCom, for example, takeovers were not 
an answer (although short selling might have been).
103
 
Macey also defends the IPO market, arguing that the rigorous 
monitoring by investment banks and other gatekeepers serves a valu-
able gatekeeping function (p 127).
104
 In describing IPOs as an effective 
governance mechanism, Macey appears largely to support the funda-
mental premise of federal securities regulation: rigorous disclosure 
requirements—imposed primarily at the time a firm issues securities 
to the public and enforced through liability for the firm, firm officials, 
and other gatekeepers—are the most effective method of promoting 
sound capital markets. At least according to Macey, the “due dili-
gence” process, by which underwriters and other gatekeepers protect 
investors, results from statutory obligations imposed by the Securities 
Act of 1933 (p 127).
105
 In imposing these obligations, Congress deter-
mined that market-based incentives, reputational constraints, and 
norms were insufficient to prevent gatekeepers from engaging in decep-
tive sales practices, market manipulation, or outright fraud.
106
 Indeed, in 
regulating the IPO market, Congress used strict liability (mediated by 
affirmative defenses), a particularly strong form of regulation.
107
 
The recent financial meltdown suggests that the regulatory inter-
ventions of the public offering process serve a valuable function in 
curbing market excess. The overwhelming majority of financial instru-
ments that turned out to be excessively risky or outright fraudulent 
were sold through private placements or were specifically exempted—
by Congress or SEC rule—from regulatory oversight.
108
 The vast 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Indeed, an active takeover market may create additional incentives for incumbent man-
agement to commit fraud in an effort to maintain a sufficiently high enough stock price to pre-
vent a hostile bid. 
 104 Commentators continue to debate the effectiveness of gatekeepers. See, for example, 
John C. Coffee, Jr, Understanding Enron: “It’s about the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 Bus L 1403, 
1408–16 (2002) (identifying various reasons for gatekeeper failure). 
 105 Macey explains that underwriters and others engage in due diligence in order “to avoid 
legal liability” (p 127). 
 106 See Federal Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce, HR Rep 
No 85, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1933) (“The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities 
was made possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers of 
those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of 
investment in any enterprise.”). See also Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: 
An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 
76 Wash U L Q 537, 592 (1998) (describing IPOs as “analogous to insider trading”). 
 107 See Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U Cin L Rev 139, 154–55 
(2004) (identifying the strict liability nature of a § 11 claim, but noting that the due diligence de-
fense creates liability akin to negligence). 
 108 See Geithner Cracks Down on Derivatives, CNNMoney.com (July 10, 2009), online at 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/10/news/economy/regulate_derivatives.reut/index.htm?postversio
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$450 billion global derivatives market, which included the now infam-
ous credit default swaps that led to AIG’s collapse, operated completely 
outside the authority of the SEC, the CFTC, and the Federal Reserve.
109
 
Most collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are sold pursuant to an 
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 
1933, such as Rule 144A, which exempts securities sold exclusively to 
qualified institutional buyers.
110
 Absent regulatory supervision, it ap-
pears that even the most sophisticated investors, such as the world’s 
largest investment banks, could not protect themselves adequately. 
At the same time, it is necessary to be cautious in extolling the vir-
tues of the IPO market. As many scholars have observed, the informa-
tional efficiency upon which Macey relies in defending capital market 
discipline is more limited in the IPO market.
111
 Scholars have identified 
evidence of possible inefficiencies, including underpricing,
112
 the so-called 
“hot issues market,”
113
 and long-term underperformance of IPO stocks.
114
 
                                                                                                                           
n=2009071013 (visited Feb 22, 2010) (describing Timothy Geithner as acknowledging that the 
derivatives market had been virtually unregulated). 
 109 See id (noting the role of credit default swaps in the collapse of AIG); Jill E. Fisch, Top 
Cop or Regulatory Flop?: The SEC at 75, 95 Va L Rev 785, 808 (2009) (describing the process by 
which regulators exempted credit default swaps and most derivatives from regulation as either 
securities or commodities). 
 110 17 CFR § 230.144A. See, for example, J.P. Morgan Securities Inc, CDO Handbook *31 
(May 29, 2001), online at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/7802583/JP-MORGAN-Collateralized-
debt-obligations-(CDOs)-Handbook (visited Sept 20, 2009) (stating that most CDOs are sold 
through exemptions or in transactions not subject to the registration requirements). 
 111 See, for example, In re IPO Securities Litigation, 471 F3d 24, 42 (2d Cir 2006) (stating 
that “the market for IPO shares is not efficient”). 
 112 Underpricing refers to the difference between the IPO price and its subsequent market 
price. Studies have documented typical IPO underpricing at around 15 percent. See, for example, 
Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J Fin 3, 3 (1991) (noting 
that the average underpricing is 16.4 percent), citing Roger Ibbotson, Jody Sindelar, and Jay 
Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, 1 J Applied Corp Fin 37, 41 table 1 (1998). This underpricing 
represents a cost to the issuer. See Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset 
about Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 Rev Fin Stud 413, 413 (2002) (describing under-
pricing as proceeds foregone by the issuer). See generally Jonathan A. Shayne and Larry D. 
Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 Vand L Rev 965 (1995) 
(arguing that the IPO market is inefficient). 
 113 See Billing v Credit Suisse First Boston, 426 F3d 130, 139 n 7 (2d Cir 2005) (defining a 
“hot issue” as a security for which investor demand exceeds supply, so that the stock trades at an 
immediate premium after the IPO). 
 114 See, for example, Alexander Ljungqvist, Vikram Nanda, and Rajdeep Singh, Hot Mar-
kets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing *21–22 (NYU Working Paper, Sept 2001), online at 
http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/26536/2/FIN-01-007.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2009) (attributing 
pricing anomalies in the IPO market to underwriters taking advantage of irrational investors). 
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These inefficiencies suggest irrationality on the part of IPO investors and 
favoritism rather than gatekeeping by investment bankers.
115
 
In addition, the IPO market offers some difficulty for Macey’s as-
sessment of takeover defenses. Jonathan Karpoff finds that a majority 
of IPO firms have antitakeover defenses in place at the time they go 
public.
116
 The extent to which these defenses are priced-in is unclear, but 
this evidence suggests either that the market’s pricing of takeover de-
fenses in an IPO is inefficient
117
 or that takeover defenses are not 
wealth-destroying for shareholders. In his work on the role of lawyers in 
drafting these provisions, John Coates raises further questions about the 
effectiveness of gatekeepers in protecting investor interests.
118
 
As for hedge funds and other activist investors, Macey is clearly 
right in identifying their valuable role in finding market inefficiencies 
and other arbitrage opportunities (p 246). Macey’s characterization of 
hedge funds as focused on corporate governance is, however, some-
thing of an overstatement (pp 244–45). To be sure, Carl Icahn, Rela-
tional Investors, Crescendo Partners, and several others have impres-
sive track records in identifying undervalued corporations and em-
ploying strategies designed to improve their performance.
119
 This form 
of activism is not new—many securities litigators from the mid-1980s 
recognize hedge funds as employing strategies previously used by so-
called “strategic investors.”
120
 Yet activist hedge funds represent only a 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id at *1. See also Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral 
Finance 187 (Oxford 2000) (describing the ability of managers to manipulate earnings and fool 
IPO investors into excessive optimism). 
 116 Laura C. Field and Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses at IPO Firms *3 (working 
paper, June 2000), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=236043 (visited Sept 15, 2009) (finding that 
53 percent of over one thousand firms that went public over a four-year period had at least one 
antitakeover device in place). 
 117 See Robert Daines and Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?: 
Antitakeover Protections in IPOs, 17 J L, Econ, & Org 83 (2001) (suggesting this possibility). 
 118 John C. Coates, IV, Explaining Variations in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 
Cal L Rev 1301, 1313, 1383 (2001) (concluding that key terms in IPO charters result from lawyer-
client agency costs and are not efficient). 
 119 Phred Dvorak and Joann S. Lublin, Boards Give Up Taming Act—Activist Investors Take 
Seats Increasingly without Fight, Wall St J C1 (Apr 7, 2008). 
 120 See, for example, Gillette Co v RB Partners, 693 F Supp 1266, 1271 (D Mass 1988). The 
Gillette court explained strategic investing as follows: 
In the parlance adopted for the purposes of this litigation, in making strategic block in-
vestments, GTO identifies companies whose shares are selling below what GTO believes 
the company as a whole could be sold for. GTO buys a large block of the company’s stock. 
It then seeks to influence management to sell the company at a premium. If successful, this 
strategy would generate a quick and big profit for GTO and its investors. 
Id at 1271. 
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small percentage of the industry,
121
 and corporate governance-type 
activism is only one of a variety of hedge fund strategies.  
Even activist hedge funds focus primarily on financial engineer-
ing rather than long-term operating strategies.
122
 While it may make 
sense to sell off a subsidiary, engage in a stock repurchase, or increase 
corporate borrowing, these are the strategies of former investment 
bankers, not long-term “strategic partners” (pp 248–49)
123
 and it is un-
clear whether they truly enhance long-term corporate performance.
124
  
For example, one of the more common changes advocated by 
hedge funds is increasing corporate leverage. Leverage has the effect of 
multiplying shareholder returns so long as the firm’s profits exceed its 
cost of borrowing. It is an effective strategy as long as profits are high 
and interest rates are low. When the credit markets dried up in the fall 
of 2008, firms that had relied on credit rather than cash reserves found 
it difficult to weather the economic crisis. Studying hedge fund activism 
before the credit crisis, April Klein and Emanuel Zur found negative 
effects on firm creditworthiness including a reduction in bondholder 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U Pa L Rev 1021, 1046 (2007) (citing a J.P. Morgan study stating that as 
little as 5 percent of hedge fund assets are invested in activist strategies). From a pool estimated 
to contain about 8,500 funds, for example, Alon Brav, et al, identified a total of 236 activist hedge 
funds for the period 2001–2006, and Klein found 101 for the period 2003–2005. Brav, et al, 63 J 
Fin at 1739 (cited in note 65); April Klein and Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activ-
ism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors *14 (working paper, Nov 2008), online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=913362 (visited Nov 3, 2009). See also Aman-
da Cantrell, Hedge Funds Launch, Close in Record Numbers, CNNMoney.com (Mar 1, 2006), 
online at http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/01/markets/hedgefund_stats (visited Feb 24, 2010) (re-
porting that, as of the end of 2005, there were roughly 8,500 hedge funds in existence). 
 122 See Lipton and Savitt, 93 Va L Rev at 746 (cited in note 67) (describing hedge fund 
activists as “financial engineers”). 
 123 In analyzing the strategies of activist investors, Macey does not distinguish sharply be-
tween hedge funds and private equity (indeed, he argues that the strategies of the two have con-
verged) (p 245). Private equity operates quite differently from hedge funds, however. Increasingly, 
private equity firms bring in former public company executives, who focus more on operational strate-
gy. See Emily Thornton, Going Private, Bus Wk 52 (Feb 27, 2006) (describing private equity executives 
as having the freedom to “repair [the] compan[y] for the long term”). This focus is possible, in part, 
because of the longer time frame associated with private equity investments. See ‘True Turnaround 
Specialists’ Are Poised to Survive in Today’s Challenging Private Equity Market, Knowledge@Wharton 
(July 23, 2009), online at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2303 (visited 
Sept 15, 2009) (describing how, in light of current financial conditions, the time frame for private equity 
investments has expanded from 3–5 years to 5–8 years). 
 124 See Chris Serres, Targeting Target, Star Trib D1 (Jan 13, 2008) (criticizing a hedge fund 
for advocating the sale of one of Wendy’s fastest growing units and observing that, although the 
sale generated substantial gain for the hedge fund, Wendy’s price subsequently fell by almost 
50 percent). 
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returns and a dramatic increase in firm risk.
125
 Furthermore, if pressuring 
issuers to increase leverage is a common hedge fund strategy, it is likely 
to increase systemic as well as firm-specific risk.
126
  
Even hedge fund strategies that do not involve leverage can con-
tribute to systemic risk. Moreover, the secrecy of a particular hedge 
fund’s strategy does not prevent its position from being correlated 
with those of other hedge funds. In particular, hedge funds control a 
tremendous amount of money that is often deployed in the form of 
market-based bets. To the extent that they are able to find willing 
counterparties, hedge funds dramatically increase the level of specula-
tive market activity. Even if their bets are right, the losses may be de-
vastating for the counterparties. The subprime crisis offers an example. 
A substantial number of hedge funds bet against the housing market 
by purchasing credit default swaps. AIG served as the counterparty on 
these swaps. When the housing market collapsed, not only did AIG 
suffer huge losses, but the hedge funds made collateral calls that 
created an immediate liquidity crisis.
127
 This lack of liquidity, in turn, 




Moreover, hedge funds historically have been virtually unregu-
lated, although the financial crisis will likely lead to increased regula-
tion in the future.
129
 Macey’s citation to the Williams Act
130
 as a regulato-
ry restriction on hedge fund activism is unpersuasive (p 122); for most 
hedge fund activism, the Williams Act is simply irrelevant. Unless a 
hedge fund is making a tender offer, the Williams Act does not require 
it to disclose anything until after it acquires its stock, at which point dis-
closure does not increase the fund’s acquisition costs. Activist hedge 
funds often welcome this disclosure as providing a vehicle for making 
                                                                                                                           
 125 April Klein and Emanuel Zur, The Implications of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target 
Firm’s Existing Bondholders *26–27 (working paper, Nov 2008) (on file with author) (finding 
that within a year of being targeted by a hedge fund, 29 percent of the targets’ credit ratings are 
downgraded). 
 126 Macey, however, argues that hedge funds pose no systemic risk “because of the incredi-
ble diversity in their investment strategies” (p 268).  
 127 See Serena Ng, Hedge Funds May Get AIG Cash: Some Bailout Money Is Set aside to 
Pay Firms That Bet Housing Market Would Crater, Wall St J A1 (Mar 18, 2009) (describing the 
liquidity crisis created by hedge funds’ transactions with AIG). 
 128 See Joe Nocera, Propping up a House of Cards, NY Times B1 (Feb 28, 2009) (describing 
government’s bailout of AIG and explaining why the bailout was necessary). 
 129 See Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009, 2009 HR 711, 111th Cong, 1st Sess 
(Jan 27, 2009) (proposing to extend the registration requirement under the Investment Advisors 
Act to hedge funds).  
 130 Williams Act of 1968 § 3, Pub L No 90-439, 82 Stat 454, 456.  
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their case public. Hedge funds that do not have an interest in affecting 
the control of a publicly traded issuer—the vast majority of hedge 
funds—often need not disclose anything under the Williams Act.
 
 
Macey’s concern that required disclosure will increase the cost of 
purchasing control appears at odds with his defense of takeovers as bene-
fitting target shareholders. If a hedge fund purchases control, pre-
acquisition disclosure enables public shareholders to share some of the 
benefits of the fund’s activism by demanding a higher price. If a hedge 
fund could purchase control without disclosing its intentions, the benefit 
to target company shareholders would be reduced. This would have the 
effect of converting the takeover market into a private arbitrage oppor-
tunity for bidders rather than a corporate governance mechanism.
131
  
Perhaps the most creative part of Promises Kept is the chapter on 
Quirky Governance (pp 165–98). In this chapter, Macey draws an 
analogy between whistle-blowing and insider trading as tools for ex-
posing corporate misconduct. He compares the actions and motives of 
Raymond Dirks, whom the SEC charged with insider trading, with 
those of Sherron Watkins in the Enron case. Although he does not 
“vilify” her, Macey portrays Watkins far less favorably than he por-
trays Dirks (p 172).  
Generalizing from this comparison, Macey argues that the mo-
tives of insider traders and whistle-blowers are typically quite similar. 
Insider trading, he explains, is, however, a potentially more effective 
governance mechanism than standard whistle-blowing, both because it 
creates a financial incentive to expose wrongdoing and because the 
employee’s financial investment increases the credibility of his or her 
disclosure (pp 175–76). 
Macey goes on to consider the legitimacy of permitting a limited 
form of insider trading—short selling by innocent employees with 
knowledge of corporate misconduct. He argues that such selling is 
technically consistent with at least the property rights view of insider 
trading because a company does not have a proprietary interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of its ongoing fraudulent behavior (p 184). 
Drawing upon sources ranging from John Locke to John Rawls, he 
also addresses fairness considerations (pp 189–93).  
                                                                                                                           
 131 This concern is potentially applicable to private equity investing as well. To the extent 
that private equity firms take their portfolio companies private before making operational 
changes, the gains from those changes do not inure to the benefit of public shareholders. Indeed, 
public shareholders may sell their stock in a “trough,” only to see the company subsequently go 
public at a much higher price.  
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Macey’s defense of short selling is one of the most important 
components of Promises Kept. As Macey notes, short selling has tradi-
tionally been denounced by issuers and regulators (p 165).
132
 The SEC 
has responded to issuer complaints of short selling by opening investi-
gations and, in some cases, bringing enforcement actions against hedge 
funds and other investors who sell short.
133
 Recently, Overstock.com 
sued a research firm that issued negative reports on its stock and a 
hedge fund that sold its stock short.
134
 One of the SEC’s first (and on-
ly) responses to the market crisis during the summer of 2008 was to 
introduce repeated bans on short selling, seemingly with the idea that, 
if investors could not sell short, prices would not fall.
135
 Yet, as Macey 
explains, short sellers provide a critical role in detecting overpricing 
and improving capital market efficiency (p 173).
136
 Their ability to do 
so currently remains in jeopardy. 
Macey’s defense of short selling is limited to the whistle-blower 
context, yet if his goal is to provide financial incentives that will en-
courage insiders to reveal fraud, insider trading is an imprecise solu-
tion. Among other concerns, there is no correlation between the whis-
tle-blower’s reward from insider trading and the social value of the 
disclosure; the whistle-blower’s payoff depends only on the amount of 
money that he or she is willing to invest. A more finely tuned solution 
would incentivize low-level employees with a bounty tied to the value 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Bruce V. Bigelow, Angry CEO Takes Aim at Short-Sellers and Cohorts: Columnist 
from San Diego Swept up in Controversy, San Diego Union-Trib H1 (Mar 19, 2006) (describing 
the “war . . . between publicly traded companies and traders who bet against them”). 
 133 Short selling is legal, but the SEC’s actions have been predicated on allegations of abuse 
or manipulation. See Kenneth M. Breen, et al, NYAG and SEC Announce Wide-Ranging Market 
Manipulation Probes; SEC Adopts New Rules to Combat Abusive Short Selling *3 (Paul Hastings, 
Sept 2008), online at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1010.pdf?wt.mc_ID (vi-
sited Sept 20, 2009) (describing SEC enforcement actions against short sellers). 
 134 See Overstock.com, Inc v Gradient Analytics, Inc, 61 Cal Rptr 3d 29, 34 (Cal App 2007). 
The SEC opened an investigation into the matter but terminated it with a recommendation that 
no enforcement action be taken. See Gradient Analytics, SEC Terminates Investigation of Gra-
dient Analytics, Say No Enforcement Action Recommended (Feb 14, 2007), online at 
http://www.gradientanalytics.com/news/GA_PR_SECDropsInvestigation.pdf (visited Sept 15, 
2009) (announcing termination of SEC investigation). 
 135 See Fisch, 95 Va L Rev at 803–04 (cited in note 109) (describing short selling bans). 
 136 Jonathan M. Karpoff and Lou Xiaoxia, Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct (working 
paper, Aug 5, 2009), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102853 (visited Sept 20, 2009) (finding 
that short sellers provide external benefits to uninformed investors “by helping to uncover finan-
cial misconduct and by keeping prices closer to fundamental values”). See generally Alexander 
Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (The Uni-
versity of Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper No 08-22, Oct 2008), online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133771 (visited Sept 15, 2009) (discussing the role of employees, short 
sellers, and others in uncovering fraud). 
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of their disclosure. This approach would resemble the qui tam system 
currently in place under the federal False Claims Act.
137
  
Macey’s proposal also creates a potential moral hazard problem 
in that insiders might be encouraged to disseminate negative informa-
tion in order to create trading opportunities. Distinguishing good faith 
whistle-blowing from vindictiveness is already difficult without the 
added motive of personal financial gain. If regulators view the poten-
tial for manipulation as significant, the risk of sanctions is likely to 
have a substantial chilling effect on whistle-blower trading. Nonethe-
less, the basic premise of this proposal—providing financial incentives 
for corporate insiders to reveal information that increases capital 
market transparency—is sound. As such, Macey’s suggestion warrants 
further development. 
III.  THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The core premise of Promises Kept is that market discipline is a 
more effective corporate governance mechanism than gatekeepers or 
procedural mechanisms mandated by external regulators. Develop-
ments subsequent to the publication of Macey’s book, specifically the 
Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 and its impact on the broader global 
economy, attest to the accuracy of many of Macey’s criticisms.  
The dramatic failure of the credit agencies is particularly notable. 
Before the revelations in the summer of 2008,
138
 Macey observed that 
credit rating agencies “provid[e] no information of value” (p 115). 
Subsequent developments revealed not only that the rating agencies 
had modeled the risk of structured financial products inappropriately, 
but they had also, in some cases, designed the very products they were 
rating in collaboration with the issuers. Moreover, Macey is spot on in 
attributing the failure of the rating agencies to the regulatory structure 
within which they operate. As Macey explains, the SEC’s Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
139
 (NRSRO) designation 
empowers the rating agencies to designate which securities are suitable 
for a host of regulated investors including banks, money market funds, 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat 696, codified as amended at 31 USC §§ 3729–33. See Dyck, 
Morse, and Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? at *25–27 (cited in note 136) 
(proposing qui tam provision to increase financial incentives for uncovering and reporting 
fraud); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 L & Contemp 
Probs 167, 169–70 (1997) (proposing qui tam provision to address agency problems in private 
securities fraud litigation).  
 138 See Aaron Lucchetti, S&P Email: ‘We Should Not Be Rating It,’ Wall St J B1 (Aug 2, 
2008) (reporting that analysts at S&P would rate every deal, no matter how bad). 
 139 17 CFR § 240.17g1–6 (2008) (requiring NRSROs to register with the SEC). 
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and pension funds (p 115).
140
 These regulations have the effect of substi-
tuting the agency for the market, as well as creating an artificial demand 
for ratings irrespective of their underlying accuracy.
141
 
Recent events also add fuel to Macey’s criticisms of the account-
ing industry.
142
 Macey argues that Sarbanes-Oxley does not adequately 
address problems of firm capture and the absence of sufficient reputa-
tional constraints on accounting firms, reasoning that the cartelization 
of the industry prevents a market-based response to the demand for 
quality auditing services (pp 161–63).
143
 Concededly, audit fees have 
gone up,
144
 and auditors have reportedly become more conservative.
145
 
Yet the accounting industry has substantially contributed to the lack 
of transparency in the financial statements of large financial institu-
tions through deficiencies and inconsistencies in its standards for re-
porting off-balance-sheet transactions, derivatives, and toxic assets.
146
 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See John P. Hunt, The SEC’s Proposed Rating Agency Rules: Unresolved Conflicts 
(Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy Working Paper, June 28, 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1284709 (visited Oct 18, 2009) (describing the importance of an 
NRSRO rating).  
 141 See Charles Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New and  
What’s Next *27 (working paper, Oct 2, 2008), online at http://www.williams.edu/Economics/  
seminars/Calomiris_10_02_08.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2009):  
[Rating agencies were] transparently understating risk and inflating the grading scale of 
their debt ratings for securitized products so that institutional investors—who are con-
strained by various regulations to invest in debts highly rated by NRSROs—would be able 
to invest as they liked without being bound by the constraints of regulation or the best in-
terests of their clients. 
 142 The downturn has not uncovered a major accounting scandal to date. As the Financial 
Times notes, however, “PwC’s role as auditor and consultant for Northern Rock has been ques-
tioned, as has Ernst & Young’s audit of Lehman Brothers.” Accountants, Fin Times 14 (Sept 8, 
2009) (noting that “litigation tends to lag behind a recession”).  
 143 The evidence on whether auditor reputation matters is mixed. See Joseph Weber, Mi-
chael Willenborg, and Jieying Zhang, Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG 
Germany and ComROAD AG, 46 J Acct Rsrch 941, 943, 945–48 (2008) (summarizing existing 
literature but finding evidence that, in Germany, reputation matters). 
 144 See Michael Ettredge, Chan Li, and Susan Scholz, Audit Fees and Auditor Dismissals in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 21 Acct Horizons 371, 372 (2007) (reporting increases in required audit-
ing work and in auditing fees for public companies following Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 145 Accountants, Fin Times at 14 (cited in note 142) (stating that accounting firms have 
become more conservative since the downturn). 
 146 See David Reilly, Financial Crisis May Reach Auditors, Wall St J Online (Mar 14, 2010), 
online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703457104575121920770049774.html 
(visited Mar 26, 2010) (describing the focus in the Lehman bankruptcy examiner’s report on 
Lehman’s accounting policy and Ernst & Young’s audits of that accounting). See also Tammy 
Whitehouse, Lawmakers Rap FASB on Sub-prime; More, Compliance Wk (Feb 20, 2008), online 
at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3959/lawmakers-rap-fasb-on-sub-prime-more (visited 
Oct 18, 2009) (“Collapsing credit markets have exposed a weakness that remains in accounting 
rules, even after Enron’s collapse first underlined the need for more transparency around off-
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Anecdotal evidence suggests the industry is unable even to keep 
its own house in order. On July 31, 2009, Huron Consulting (which was 
formed by former partners at Arthur Andersen and which specializes 
in forensic accounting) announced expected material weaknesses in 
its own internal controls over financial reporting.
147
 It disclosed errors 
that required it to restate three years of financial statements and to 
reduce its reported income by almost 50 percent.
148
 Clearly neither the 
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms nor the founders’ prior association with Ar-
thur Andersen provided adequate incentives for Huron’s partners to 
invest sufficient effort in maintaining the firm’s reputation. As 




Finally, as I have detailed elsewhere,
150
 developments suggest that 
Macey is perhaps charitable in characterizing the recent enforcement 
performance of the SEC as “anemic” (p 106). The revelation, in No-
vember 2008, of the $50 billion fraud at Bernard Madoff Investment 
Securities LLC shocked the investment community, not merely because 
of the extent of Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, but because the SEC 
had received and ignored “[c]redible and specific allegations regarding 
Madoff’s financial wrongdoing going back to at least 1999.”
151
 A report 
by the SEC Inspector General revealed further deficiencies in connec-
tion with the SEC’s oversight of Bear Stearns and its administration of 
the Consolidated Supervised Entities Program.
152
 Macey’s charge about 
                                                                                                                           
balance-sheet activity.”); Fisch, 95 Va L Rev at 806–07 (cited in note 109) (describing lack of 
transparency under FASB accounting rules and controversy over shifting to mark-to-market). 
 147 See Huron Consulting Group, Huron Consulting Group Announces Intention to Restate 
Financial Statements and Management Changes; The Company Provides Preliminary Second 
Quarter and Estimated Full Year 2009 Revenues (July 31, 2009), online at 
http://ir.huronconsultinggroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=180006&p=RssLanding&cat=news&id=13
15063 (visited Sept 20, 2009) (“[M]anagement . . . expects that it will identify one or more ma-
terial weaknesses in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting.”).  
 148 Id (reporting reduction of $57 million in income from 2006 to the first quarter of 2009). 
 149 Jonathan Weil, Blowing up Your Company Gets Raised to Art Form, Bloomberg (Aug 6, 
2009), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=afQBMs5AIpvc 
(visited Sept 15, 2009). 
 150 See Fisch, 95 Va L Rev at 803–15 (cited in note 109) (evaluating the SEC’s recent en-
forcement efforts). 
 151 Congress Plans to Investigate Madoff Scheme; Mukasey Recuses Himself from Justice 
Probe, Law.com (Dec 18, 2008), online at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202426854578 
(visited Sept 21, 2009). 
 152 SEC, SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised 
Entity Program *ix–xi (Sept 25, 2008), online at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/ 
2008/446-a.pdf (visited Feb 23, 2010) (identifying a variety of oversight failures). 
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politicization (p 110) also appears supported by recent Commission 
votes on controversial issues that were split along party lines.
153
  
Yet it would be overly simplistic to attribute the financial crisis to 
a failure in corporate governance. The crisis revealed substantial 
weaknesses in capital market discipline as well. In particular, the mar-
kets appeared unable to assess and price the riskiness of financial 
firms, to value derivatives, swaps, and other financial products, and to 
cope with the potential effect of systematic, as opposed to firm-
specific, risk.
154
 An unprecedented number of firms engaged in un-
sound business practices and took on enormous amounts of risk with-
out the corresponding check of market discipline reducing their stock 
prices. Indeed, the inflated stock prices enjoyed by these firms enabled 
their managers to justify collecting huge compensation packages as 
they drove their companies toward collapse.
155
  
Can it truly be said, as Macey claims, that “share prices provide 
the best lens with which to evaluate corporate performance” (p 155) 
when Bear Stearns traded for almost $170 per share in January 2007, 
Lehman’s stock price was over $65 per share at the beginning of 2007 
before falling by more than 70 percent in the next six months (and 
subsequently becoming worthless when the company declared bank-
ruptcy), and Enron traded for over $90 per share in August 2000? Ef-
fective capital markets discipline requires more than informational 
efficiency; it requires sufficient firm-specific information to be availa-
ble to the market and for investors to incorporate that information 
into their pricing and trading decisions. In particular, three develop-
                                                                                                                           
 153 Most recently, the Commission split 3-2 on a proposed rule providing shareholder access 
to the proxy. See Sara Hansard, SEC Commissioners Approve Proposal to Allow Shareholders to 
Nominate Directors, Investment News (May 20, 2009), online at http://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article/20090520/REG/905209985 (visited Oct 18, 2009) (describing party line vote). Under the 
prior administration, a differently composed SEC restricted proxy access, again voting along 
party lines. See Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in Jonathan R. Macey, ed, The Iconic Cases 
in Corporate Law 46, 64–65 (West 2008) (describing the history of proposed Rule 14a-11). 
 154 See Dominique Strauss-Kahn, A Systemic Crisis Demands Systemic Solutions, Fin Times 
13 (Sept 22, 2008) (describing the financial crisis as “the result of regulatory failure to guard 
against excessive risk-taking in the financial system, especially in the US”);  
Adair Turner, The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation,  
The Economist’s Inaugural City Lecture (Jan 21, 2009), online at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/  
pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/0121_at.shtml (visited Sept 15, 2009) (describing 
the biggest regulatory failure as “the failure to identify that the whole financial system was 
fraught with market-wide, systemic risk”). 
 155 See, for example, CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis, Hearing before the House Commit-
tee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong, 2d Sess 110-81 (2008) (testimony of Nell 
Minow) (describing how inflated earnings reported by companies like Countrywide and Citi-
group enabled executives to receive excessive compensation). 
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ments threaten the effectiveness of capital market discipline: a decline 
in transparency, an increase in the percentage of equity held by inves-
tor intermediaries, and a decrease in accountability.  
With respect to market transparency, Macey accepts and even 
endorses the role of regulation in mandating disclosure (p 158). Yet 
existing regulatory gaps reduce the quality and quantity of disclosure. 
Exemptions from the registration process such as Rule 144A allow 
issuers to sell both traditional securities and new financial instruments 
without the gatekeepers and disclosure requirements mandated by the 
IPO process.
156
 The Commodities Futures Modernization Act exempts 
swaps and most over-the-counter derivatives from regulation by either 
the SEC or the CFTC
157
 and facilitated the dramatic growth of the vir-
tually unregulated private credit markets as a source of capital before 
their collapse in the summer of 2008. Similarly, unregulated counter-
parties, including hedge funds, have enabled issuers to buy, sell, and 
repackage unprecedented quantities of risk, often with limited disclo-
sure of that risk to the public markets and regulators.
158
  
Even publicly traded companies have become less transparent. 
Enron dramatically demonstrated that if the market is given fraudu-
lent information, share prices cannot provide reliable information 
about firm value. Apart from the fraudulent aspects of its financial 
statements, however, Enron showed how accounting rules and struc-
tured transactions allow issuers to obfuscate the nature of their opera-
tions and the level of risk to which they are exposed.
159
  
Enron is neither an isolated nor outdated example. The recent de-
bate over the appropriate methodology in valuing so-called toxic assets 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 Va L Rev 1025, 1059 (2009) (describing the 144A market as a “private 
market [that is] the economic equivalent to a registered public offering”). 
 157 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 § 1(a)(5), Pub L No 106-554, 114 Stat 
2763, 2763A-365, codified at 7 USC §§ 1–27. 
 158 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market and 
Corporate Governance, 34 J Corp L 641, 676 (2009): 
[T]he private credit market is comprised of investors, such as hedge funds, who fall outside 
of regular review. Regulations or industry initiatives that enhance transparency—in pricing, 
secondary trading, and ownership—may help address systemic concerns arising from the 
possibility of accumulations of risk over which neither regulators nor market participants 
today are aware. Doing so may also enhance the availability of information in the private 
credit market and the informational content of trading prices. 
 159 See, for example, William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 
Tulane L Rev 1275, 1309–11 (2002) (describing Enron’s transactions involving special purpose 
entities and stating that the types and magnitudes of the transactions were disclosed in Enron’s 
financial statements). 
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for the purposes of financial disclosure illustrates the continued difficul-
ty—practically and politically—in achieving transparency.
160
 After the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) changed its requirements 
on fair value accounting,
161
 not surprisingly, the major financial institutions 
reported dramatically improved financial results.
162
 Despite the fact that 
these changes were purely cosmetic, the market responded to them fa-
vorably.
163
 Revelations about Lehman’s “Repo 105” maneuver raise simi-
lar concerns about the lack of transparency.
164
 
A second concern is the increase in investor intermediaries. 
Transparency is not enough; disclosed information must be incorpo-
rated into share price through the actions of informed traders. There is 
reason to believe, however, that the percentage of such trading has 
declined. A growing amount of US equity is effectively controlled by 
intermediaries—mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and so 
forth.
165
 The incentives and objectives of these intermediaries, and their 
agents who make trading decisions, differ from those of traditional 
retail investors.
166
 Some intermediaries invest passively in accordance 
with an index, some engage in herding, some seek to maximize their 
performance relative to a benchmark or a peer group, some seek ab-
solute returns, and some may take advantage of momentum and irra-
tionality to engage in trading strategies that actually drive prices away 
from true value, as in riding a bubble.
167
 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See Fisch, 95 Va L Rev at 806–07 (cited in note 109). See also Jonathan Weil, Wells Far-
go’s Profit Looks Too Good to Be True, Bloomberg (Apr 16, 2009), online at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=a6sv0hG.nW7g&refer=home (visited 
Sept 20, 2009) (describing the lack of transparency in Wells Fargo’s financial statements proc-
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 161 See Kara Scannell, FASB Eases Mark-to-Market Rules, Wall St J C1 (Apr 2, 2009) (re-
porting FASB change easing requirement that banks market assets to the market). 
 162 See, for example, Susan Pulliam and Tom McGinty, Congress Helped Banks Defang Key 
Rule, Wall St J A1 (June 3, 2009) (reporting that Citigroup stated that the rule change “added 
$413 million to first-quarter earnings”). 
 163 See id (stating that the FASB accounting change “helped turn around investor sentiment 
on banks”). 
164 See Reilly, Financial Crisis May Reach Auditors (cited in note 146) (describing the bank-
ruptcy examiner’s allegations that the “Repo 105” maneuver made Lehman “appear financially 
stronger than was really the case”). 
 165  See generally Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Role of Intermediaries in the Securities Markets, 158 
U Penn L Rev (forthcoming 2010) (describing the increasing intermediation of US capital markets). 
 166 See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of  
Ownership from Control, 33 Seattle U L Rev (forthcoming 2010) (describing differing incentives 
and objectives of securities intermediaries such as pension funds and mutual funds). 
 167 Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty 
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J Corp L 715, 729 (2003) (explaining how the effect of arbi-
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Although the literature on price formation and market efficiency 
has become increasingly sophisticated, it does not yet incorporate the 
effect of these intermediaries on the price efficiency upon which Ma-
cey’s governance structure depends. Increasing investor passivity, in 
the form of indexed investors who buy without regard to firm infor-
mation, reduces the market’s responsiveness, while leveraged inves-
tors who trade on momentum may increase market volatility. In addi-
tion, to the extent the price setters in the current market are con-
cerned with financial results other than long-term corporate perfor-
mance, operational decisions that cater to the interests of these share-
holders may be inconsistent with broader conceptions of social wel-
fare. This inconsistency threatens the standard economic story, in 
which shareholder primacy maximizes firm value because the interests 
of the shareholders are most closely aligned with the long-term inter-
ests of the corporation.
168
 Most importantly, investors who are eva-
luated on the basis of relative returns or market benchmarks may be 
insufficiently sensitive to systemic risk. This in turn precludes the mar-
ket from imposing adequate discipline on firm managers who engage 
in excessive risk-taking.  
Finally, the incentives of issuers and their agents to provide full 
and accurate disclosures are reduced by the limited accountability 
they bear for misinformation. As Macey recognizes, accurate share 
prices allow the market to discipline corporate decisionmakers 
(pp 155–56), yet accurate share prices depend on honest disclosure by 
those same decisionmakers. As a result, corporate officials have a 
strong incentive to manipulate their disclosure in order to reduce 
market discipline.
169
 Meaningful accountability for disclosure viola-
tions is a critical component of efficient capital markets.  
Under the current system, corporations and corporate officials 
face only limited accountability for incomplete and inaccurate disclo-
sures.
170
 Macey justifiably criticizes the SEC’s enforcement record in 
                                                                                                                           
trage trading may be “to drive up the price of already overvalued stocks, and to prolong the 
length and increase the extent of bubbles”). 
 168 See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 Ohio St L J 
1009, 1013–14 n 19 (1994) (summarizing the standard economic defense of shareholder primacy). 
 169 Officials may have an additional incentive to manipulate disclosure in order to maxim-
ize their personal compensation, particularly to the extent that compensation structures such as 
stock options are tied to share price. 
 170 The problem is particularly acute with respect to individual accountability. As some critics 
have noted, the SEC’s most recent actions have targeted firms, but the agency has failed to hold indi-
vidual wrongdoers accountable. See, for example, Rachel Beck, SEC Looks Tough, but Actions against 
Individual Misdeeds Will Prove That, Associated Press (Aug 7, 2009), online at 
http://www.startribune.com/lifestyle/yourmoney/52773477.html?elr=KArks7PYDiaK7DUdcOy_nc:D
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recent years, and studies suggest that the SEC has played a very li-
mited role in uncovering corporate fraud.
171
 As Macey observes, one 
explanation is the extent of political influence over the SEC’s activi-
ties (p 110). Policymakers have considered moving to a system in 
which the SEC is self-funded rather than dependent on Congress for 
budget increases.
172
 The recent crisis has renewed consideration of this 
option, which might provide a start toward greater independence.
173
 I 
have also argued that SEC appointments should incorporate broader 
constituency representation and diversity of focus to reduce the agen-
cy’s susceptibility to interest group capture.
174
  
One potential check on political influence and agency capture is 
private litigation, which serves as a backstop for retaining accountabil-
ity during periods when public enforcement is politically costly.
175
 The 
benefit of private litigation is twofold. First, by increasing the potential 
cost of fraud, litigation deters potential misconduct. Second, by com-
pensating traders who are misled by fraud, litigation allows unin-
formed and nontrading investors to share the costs borne by informed 
traders who produce a governance externality through information-
based trading. The financial crisis offers an opportunity to evaluate 
whether restrictions on private litigation have gone too far. Congress 
would do well to consider, for example, whether existing limitations 
on secondary actor liability, strict pleading requirements, and narrow 
understandings of causation and reliance are consistent with maintain-
ing adequate capital market discipline.  
The foregoing concerns are only a starting point in considering 
reforms to improve the effectiveness of the capital markets as a cor-
porate governance mechanism. Commentators have identified many 
other areas of concern: the high levels of leverage in the markets, ex-
cessive volatility, black pools of capital, and other methods of rapid 
                                                                                                                           
KUiacyKUzyaP37D_MDua_ eyD5PcOiUr (visited Sept 20, 2009) (stating that “the SEC must not 
only extract settlements out of companies but also individuals responsible for corporate misdeeds”). 
 171 See Dyck, Morse, and Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? at *2 (cited 
in note 136) (finding that the SEC accounts for disclosure of only 7 percent of corporate frauds).  
 172 See Suzanne Barlyn, Compliance Watch: Idea of SEC Self-funding Raises Questions, 
Dow Jones Newswires (Aug 11, 2009) (discussing pros and cons of SEC self-funding).  
 173 See Joanna Chung, Brooke Masters, and Francesco Guerrera, SEC Chief in Call for 
Funding Shake-Up, Fin Times 1 (Aug 6, 2009) (reporting SEC Chair Mary Schapiro’s statement 
that the SEC should self-fund from industry fees). 
 174 Fisch, 95 Va L Rev at 821–24 (cited in note 109).  
 175 See Edward Labaton and Jesse Strauss, The Role of Private Securities Class Actions in 
Financial Market Reform, Lead Counsel (Labaton Sucharow LLP, Summer 2009), online at 
http://www.labaton.com/en/ourpeople/upload/LeadCounsel_S09_PrivSecurities_nopage-s.pdf 
(visited Nov 3, 2009) (“Relying solely on government regulation to prevent such catastrophes is 
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and surreptitious trading. The key message of Promises Kept is that 
reform efforts are best directed to enhancing market discipline rather 
than imposing external governance mechanisms. Concededly, any reg-
ulatory reform bears with it the risk of political influence, industry 
capture, and simple government error—risks that suggest policymak-
ers should tread carefully. The message of the financial crisis, however, 
is that fear of these risks should not result in blind complacency about 
the effectiveness of market-based governance.  
CONCLUSION 
As policymakers struggle to respond to the Financial Crisis of 
2008–2009, and to implement reforms designed to increase the stabili-
ty and productivity of US corporations, understanding corporate go-
vernance can help. Promises Kept offers a valuable history and analy-
sis of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, explaining how 
they work and why they often do not. More important for current 
reform efforts, Promises Kept identifies critical weaknesses that may 
thwart even the best intentioned efforts at regulation, such as capture, 
political pressure, and regulatory arbitrage. Many of these weaknesses 
have been highlighted in the recent economic turmoil, and Macey’s 
book should serve as a warning to those who might seek solutions in 
greater board independence or regulatory agency restructurings. 
Yet it would be a mistake to attribute the financial crisis to a go-
vernance failure. As recent events have demonstrated, the capital 
markets offer increasingly high-powered incentives for issuers and 
their agents to structure, trade, and speculate in risk, and new financial 
products increase the probability that the effects of excessive risk-
taking will not be isolated within a single firm. The systemwide exter-
nalities imposed by firm failure belie the claim that shareholders are 
protected adequately from risk through proper diversification and call 
for reforms that increase governance responses to risky behavior, both 
within the firm and within the market.  
Here is where Promises Kept delivers. The appropriate objective of 
governance regulation is an efficient capital market. Regulatory re-
forms should focus on enhancing share price accuracy by mandating 
transparency, providing incentives for informed trading, and increasing 
accountability for misinformation. Changes to market structure, the 
development of new financial products, and globalization all serve to 
test the efficacy of traditional governance mechanisms. Understanding 
the deficiencies of the current system offers the promise of structuring 
markets that are better able to meet the challenges of the future.  
 
